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In 1999, during the Kosovo war, when air raid after air raid did not budge Yugoslav 
President Milosevic, the public at large in Western countries knew that once again 
something had NOT gone according to plan in the Balkans. Similar sentiments had 
befallen policy-planning units of foreign ministries in Western countries even earlier - 
not over Kosovo, but over the West's Balkan policy throughout the 90s. Some 
criticised it as too reluctant, others as an outright disaster. The fact is that there were 
four wars between 1991 and 1999 in South Eastern Europe (SEE), with some of the 
worst atrocities in Europe since World War II. 
 
Against this background, wide consensus emerged that a shift in paradigm was 
needed. These were the circumstances from which in June 1999, the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe was conceived at a conference in Cologne under German 
chairmanship. Germany held the rotating presidency of both, the EU and G8 at that 
time. 
 
What was so new about this initiative compared to previous ones? It was a different 
approach, which for the first time shared a determination to multilaterally tackle a 
problem region, which had a potential to set the European house on fire. As compared 
to earlier trials - and errors - of bilateralism in SEE (for example Paris works with 
capital A in South East Europe, Berlin with capital B, and London with capital C), the 
Stability Pact was specifically mandated with co-ordinating the efforts of assistance to 
the Balkans amongst all the donors. Practically this consists mainly of EU countries 
and the European Commission, the US, Russia, Japan, and of international 
organisations like OSCE, NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, as well as of 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as EIB, World Band, EBRD, Council 
of Europe Development Bank etc. In return, the SEE countries promised reforms and 
regional co-operation amongst each other. These two components were cornerstones 
of the "Stability-Pact-deal" and have remained the core parts of the Stability Pact's 
mandate and actions to this day. Therefore, improvements in regional co-operation are 
the yardstick by which the Stability Pact should be measured. 
 
Allow me to give you an assessment of what has worked and what did not with regard 
to these goals. I will do this 
 
1. by giving you an overview on the SP structures and main activities, 
2. by describing the methodology used 
3. and by summarising to what extent the lessons learned in the Pact could serve as a 
model elsewhere. 
 
In doing so, I will also try to assess the Stability Pact's performance during its first 
five years of existence. You might know that the Sarajevo Summit - the official 
launching of the Pact - was held 31 July 1999 and this anniversary is only a few 
months away.  
 
I. STABILITY PACT STRUCTURES AND MAIN ACTIVITIES 
Taking into account experiences and best practices of foreign assistance in Europe 
since World War II, the SP was created as a continuing "intergovernmental 
 conference" with a permanent secretariat based in Brussels. In my capacity as Special 
Co-ordinator, I am heading this office and I am chairing the SP Regional Table. The 
Regional Table is the "general assembly" of all the Stability Pact participants, and its 
decision making body. It is driven by consensus, and - very importantly - the so-called 
beneficiary countries are participating on equal footing with the donor countries and 
institutions. It is a unique partnership indeed. These "beneficiaries" include eight 
countries. To use EU jargon, they are the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo), the 
two candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania) and Moldova, which is the only one not 
to have a confirmed perspective for EU membership, but aspires nonetheless to join 
the EU at some date in the distant future. 
The SP is structured into three Working Tables, roughly modelled after the three 
baskets of the Helsinki process of 1975, today known as the OSCE. The three tables 
deal with Human Rights and Democracy, Economic Development and 
Reconstruction, and with Justice & Home Affairs and Military Security. 
 
The role of the Stability Pact is in essence matchmaking. We assume the role of 
honest brokers, trying to find donors for projects, which we think worthy of funding 
and using our good offices to resolve problems of a political nature. In order to 
qualify for the Stability Pact "label", a project should be regional in character and 
involve two, three or more countries. Project implementation and financing however 
is outside of our competence and remains entirely in the hands of the donors. Others 
develop the projects, tender them, implement them and audit them according to their 
rules and remain accountable to their supervising bodies, i.e. national parliaments or 
boards in the case of International Financial Institutions. We strive to guide SEE 
countries to design their reform agendas in line with EU laws and standards, or in line 
with other standard setting bodies such as the Council of Europe or WTO. Since these 
countries all want to join the EU some day, it is in their best interest to follow the EU 
legislative line right from the very beginning! Sometimes multilateral institutions are 
a proper match for a given programme or project; sometimes it is more promising and 
faster to approach a bilateral donor. In order to structure this process, we have 
established regular donor meetings and consultation mechanisms for the various 
initiatives, which secure permanent consultations amongst donors and help avoid 
duplications. 
 
We are active in approximately 25 domains and I would like to point out some of 
them in order to make you familiar with our working method. I will focus on six 
activities, which were selected by our shareholders - i.e. countries and institutions - as 
core objectives for 2004 and beyond. 
· Media 
We focus on legislation, especially broadcast legislation, quality programming and 
training of journalists. There are many players in this field and media is not a topic 
that has a natural regional dimension. However, all countries are confronted with 
formerly state controlled media, including electronic ones, which now have to be 
transformed into public service broadcasters outside of government control and with 
safeguarded editorial independence. This is the Stability Pact focus in the area of 
media development. 
 · Local Democracy and Cross Border Co-operation 
SEE is a region laced with a legacy from centralised governments/states. The EU, on 
the other hand, bases quite a few of its cohesion activities on functioning local and 
regional authorities. In order to install these capacities in the Balkans, we encourage 
Euroregion type set-ups across national borders, which can only become operational if 
capitals delegate some of their competences to the lower level. Ideally, this should 
include fiscal decentralisation as well. The Euroregions Sofia, Nis, Skopje or Ohrid-
Prespa, involving Macedonia, Greece and Albania, are active examples of 
Euroregions within the Stability Pact framework. 
· Free Trade and Investment 
In SEE, the myth that government money will bring a better future is hard to 
eradicate. Since we all know that the main driving force behind the economic 
development of Western Europe was exports and free trade, we try to apply this 
recipe to SEE as well. In fact, I can say we have done so with a lot of success. In a 
record of 15 months, 21 bilateral free trade agreements between seven countries were 
negotiated, thereby enlarging small markets of national economies of between 2 
million (Macedonia) and 22 million (Romania) consumers into a tariff free market of 
55 million consumers. This helps in attracting investments, especially foreign 
investments, since from a business perspective SEE only becomes attractive if you 
look at it as ONE region. 
We have several initiatives to foster investment. Jointly with the OECD the Stability 
Pact develops packages of tailored measures to improve the investment climate in 
SEE countries. This includes the organising of regular business missions for interested 
potential investors. We also associate the private sector in the form of a South East 
European Business Advisory Council, which allows us to regularly inject feedback 
from the private sector into the political reform and decision making process. 
 
· Energy 
The blueprint is strikingly simple: trading energy, connecting grids and liberalising 
markets in Southeast Europe is saving billions in comparison to efforts towards 
attaining or maintaining self-sufficiency on a national basis. To this end, the European 
Commission and the Stability Pact jointly launched an initiative for electricity and gas 
labelled South East Europe Regional Energy Market, which aims at reshuffling the 
markets in line with the relevant EU legislation (acquis communautaire). Donors have 
made it very clear that SEE countries can only expect funding if they reform and 
liberalise their energy sectors. 
· Fighting Organised Crime 
This curse - and its twin brother corruption - are damaging SEEs reputation, are 
discouraging investments and makes these societies pay a particularly heavy price in 
forlorn opportunities. But organised crime is not originating in the Balkans alone. The 
region is also a transit corridor for such "commodities" as trafficked human beings or 
drugs. Therefore, a regional approach is most efficient and needs to be connected with 
global actors such as Interpol or Europol. A Transborder Crime Fighting Centre in 
 Bucharest is operational, where 12 participating nations are represented with one 
customs and police officer each in order to help with investigations by their 
colleagues from other countries. Another important activity is the incorporation of 
international treaties, such as the UN Palermo convention, into national legislation. 
You might be surprised to learn that some countries simply do not have "organised 
criminal acts" listed as punishable offence in their penal codes. - Two secretariats, one 
in Bucharest to fight organised crime, the second one in Sarajevo against corruption, 
are supporting SEE governments in their efforts to adopt the necessary legislation and 
install domestic capacities to fight these dual demons. 
· Migration, Asylum and Refugee Return 
Until the end of 2003, the return of refugees was high on the agenda of the Stability 
Pact. We saw refugees and internally displaced persons return in record numbers in 
2001, 2002 and 2003. Today, the challenge is to keep the refugees where they 
struggled to return, in other words to have sustainable solutions, including jobs, 
housing and access to acquired rights such as pensions or tenancy rights. As the 
refugee dimension diminishes and is gradually rolled over into general reform and 
development operations, the problem of asylum and legal and illegal migration is 
growing. The countries still do not have the necessary legislation in place to deal with 
illegal migration, and most of them are severely affected by legal migration, be it 
from brain drain or by having huge diasporas, on whose remittances entire 
communities in SEE have to subsist. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY USED 
The SP does not have its own funds. This is a huge advantage, as it allows us to keep 
the structure lean and flexible. Our office has not grown since its foundation and has a 
staff of about 35 including administration. You can see, that compared to NATO or 
the EU, we are small players in Brussels. In the eyes of the general public in SEE, 
however, the SP is often associated with money - big money and never enough of it, 
of course! 
Our niche therefore has to deliver an "added value", and as I have already mentioned, 
matchmaking is probably the most important. Bringing projects and donors together 
and removing obstacles on a political level is perhaps concisely the main asset or 
added value of the Pact. For the Regional Energy Market, the SP "delivered the 
countries of the region" and brought about the mind change from the illusion of 
energy self-sufficiency to cross-border co-operation. In defence conversion, where 
NATO has acquired considerable expertise, SP succeeded in soliciting funds from the 
World Bank to retrain several thousand redundant military officers in Romania and 
Bulgaria. Needless to explain that introducing these people into a civilian workforce 
also considerably reduces a security risk. The point is that in normal operation, the 
World Bank and NATO do not meet. In the SP framework, they did and continue to 
do so. 
Another example is the integrated border management process, initiated in Ohrid 
(Macedonia) in May 2003. Borders in the Balkans are still perceived in mythical 
dimensions, wars were fought over borders! As Western Europeans we probably can 
 not properly fathom the symbolic significance, when Western Balkan Governments 
started to talk about secure and open borders and agreed to the shift from military to 
civilian border guarding, as is the EU standard practice. Again, the Stability Pact 
provided the platform to bring NATO, European Commission, OSCE and the 
countries concerned together. Of particular importance: Kosovo is fully participating 
in these activities. 
Regional ownership is another method applied. As we talk about sovereign countries 
with elected governments and parliaments, any notion of neo-colonial implementation 
of reforms is out of the question. By putting the countries themselves in charge of the 
reforms, while ensuring access to technical assistance and funding, the acceptance of 
necessary reforms is higher and more sustainable. Sometimes, this comes at a cost: it 
takes more time to operate this way! - In addition to the organised crime and 
corruption fighting secretariats located in Bucharest and Sarajevo, there is now a 
centre for the collections of small arms in Belgrade, while the seat of the international 
commission managing the Sava River will be in Zagreb along with a 20-nation strong 
Arms Control facility. 
A key component for SP involvement is the regional aspect of any proposed activity. 
Therefore the pre-condition for projects being launched within the SP framework, was 
communicated to SEE governments on the basis of conditionality right from the 
beginning. If we look back, it is correct to say that this was the stick ahead of the 
carrot. Reactions to this approach were mixed. Some governments bluntly explained 
that we could not expect them to design joint projects with neighbours they did not 
know or wish to know presently. The gradual understanding that this was in fact the 
exact intention of the conditionality encouraged several transport and finance 
ministers to join forces and submit 80 regional infrastructure projects, of which 35 
were selected at the first of two SP funding conferences in March 2000 in Brussels. 
Today, I can say, that old scepticism is fundamentally gone. Governments know that 
they have to either work together or they will fail to receive support. To refer to the 
previously outlined example, the donors made it quite clear that necessary funding for 
electricity rehabilitation could be gained, but only if the governments committed 
themselves to liberalising their markets. It did the trick. 
Generally speaking, we have today a natural and normal "European" pattern of 
consultation amongst SEE governments. What was initiated as a condition by donors 
has proven to become self-sustained through its own success! 
 
III. WHAT HAS WORKED, WHAT DID NOT? - ASSESSING THE PACT 
AFTER FIVE YEARS 
The decision to design the Pact with a mandate whereby it has to prove its added 
value -- rather than giving it "teeth" in the form of coffers full of money, has proven 
to be vital in the efforts to avoid duplication, while ensuring co-ordination amongst 
donors. A case in point is the so-called Infrastructure Steering Group, comprised 
mainly of the European Commission, the EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank. This 
body monitors the implementation and financing of regional infrastructure projects 
according to clearly defined criteria. Criteria, which are technically, economically and 
 environmentally feasible. It might surprise you to learn that this steering body is the 
only one of its kind amongst IFIs worldwide. So far, they have selected and financed 
53 infrastructure projects with a volume of 4 billion Euro in the eight recipient 
countries. 
 
Another instrument, which has worked miracles amongst neighbours -- who for some 
time seem to be trying to out do each other in terms of not wanting to acknowledge 
the government next door -- is peer-review and peer-pressure. As an example, under 
an initiative called the Investment Compact -- which is under the auspices of the 
OECD -- a catalogue has been created of 100 measures that could be applied to make 
countries in SEE more attractive for investments. Countries themselves were asked to 
choose which measure they wanted to apply on a priority basis. And against these 
promises, they were held accountable, not only by the OECD or us, but by their 
fellow SEE neighbours. The OECD gave invaluable advise, supported side-measures 
such as the establishment of foreign investors councils etc., but the actual question 
"have you done what you promised?" was asked at the twice-a-year review meetings 
by their neighbours. It became clear to all of them that they are a regional market and 
are perceived as such by potential investors, whereby a wrong decision by one would 
reflect negatively on all of them. 
An approach, which we found less successful - at least to date, is called "twinning". 
This effort aims to connect an SEE country with a transformation country out of the 
new EU members of Eastern Europe and a Western European country. This method 
was tried out in the domain of asylum and refugee legislation, and again in fighting 
organised crime. Some results were outstanding, but we learnt that this was rather due 
to individuals involved, and not so much thanks to the chosen approach of twinning. 
 
The concept of fostering regional co-operation is probably one of the least expensive 
success stories in foreign assistance in European history. With very limited resources, 
the Stability Pact has instilled the notion of regional co-operation and has succeeded 
to make it a benchmark and a qualifying precondition for EU membership. This is the 
point I am very positive about, and regional co-operation has become a self-runner. 
Countries discovered the value of regional co-operation in domains far beyond SP 
involvement. Once the neutral platform of regular contacts in the SP was established, 
ministers and officials found out that they could easily discuss topics considered taboo 
domestically. I firmly believe that the rapprochement between Serbia and NATO has 
started to ferment within the Pact. Confidence gained in talking regional co-operation 
substantially eased and greased the solving of the refugee cases between Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro. 
Even Kosovo, despite the uncertainty about its final status, is actively involved in 
over a dozen SP initiatives - sometimes with tailored arrangements; sometimes over 
protests from Belgrade! These practical activities on issues of everyday concern have 
provided the nascent Kosovo institutions with practical training in international 
cooperation, regardless of its unresolved status. 
These spin-offs and the very fact that heads of governments call on each other 
nowadays just as naturally as elsewhere in Europe, I consider one of the lasting 
legacies of the Pact. The operational costs of the Stability Pact Office are approx. 2 
million Euro per year, covered by EU funds. So if someone asks how you can make 
 eight countries perceive each other as neighbours worthy of co-operation with little 
money involved, I think the Stability Pact model is an answer. 
I beg your pardon for this self-promotion! But I think you agree with me that SEE is a 
much more stable region than it was in 1999. In case you do not follow events very 
closely, the fact that SEE is out of the headlines and off the front-pages is empirical 
evidence. Such news used to be negative; now they are absent. But in the papers' 
economics section, SEE countries start to make news. I do not univocally subscribe to 
terms like "growth region", "tiger economies" etc., but it is a fact that SEE is enjoying 
higher growth rates than most economies in Europe. This growth is from very low 
levels, I agree, but it is growth nonetheless. Experience elsewhere has shown that it is 
the economic perspective rather than the level of wealth that incites people to invest 
and to see a future for themselves. Moreover, SEE populations have less incentive to 
emigrate or to turn to shady or illegal activities. For many in Western Europe, this is 
already a big achievement. Personally, I am not content with this, as I believe that 
stabilising SEE will take some more time and can only be called irreversible if such 
remaining trouble spots as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo are brought into the main 
fold. 
 
Improvements on the political level were even more dramatic than in economics. All 
countries have held credible and clean elections repeatedly and have consolidated 
their democratic structures. Even if I take into account the setbacks of the recent 
Serbian election results or the Macedonian crisis two years ago, I firmly believe that 
the process of democratisation is irreversible in SEE. Tudjman and Milosevic are 
gone. Democratic figures and governments have emerged. What is still lacking is a 
consolidated system of political parties, but this simply will take more time. 
 
The same goes for their determination towards making difficult reforms. We will see 
the pendulum swing in either direction in these nations - as we had similar ups and 
downs in the Eastern European transition countries - but the course is clear. 
 
 
IV. LET ME CONCLUDE 
I have tried to outline the various components and parts of the engine driving the 
reform process in SEE, and to describe what is the role of the Pact in it. Let me now 
try to give you an answer regarding the fuel that this engine is running on. Most 
people answer: Money! I disagree. Money is needed, yes, but it is just another 
component of the engine. The driving force is the European and Euro-Atlantic 
perspective as they manifest themselves towards EU and NATO membership. This is 
the famous light at the end of the tunnel, which allows the governments of the day and 
the opposition to rally behind a common reform agenda. It is the glue between 
political elites - with a strong record of disappointing their electorates - and a 
sometimes disillusioned population after decades of "socialist planned" economic 
decline. It is therefore shortsighted and sometimes naïve if people ask for speeded up 
accession to the EU or even for the lowering of the threshold for entering the EU. 
Quite to the contrary, the rules should not be bent, but the perspective has to be 
maintained. This political responsibility has so far been understood by EU and NATO 
alike. I am very thankful for that. It makes my job easier and sometimes even 
 possible! 
 
If I try to assess the achievements of five years of Stability Pact, I will reiterate what I 
believe to be the elements that have successfully undergone their baptism through 
fire. The combination of democratic reforms, economic reforms and security reforms 
is a sine qua non in making SEE societies fit for the European house. The synergies 
created across the SP working tables are obvious. 
The stubborn insistence on improved regional co-operation has paid off, sometimes 
with SEE politicians grumbling. The Pact is a mechanism by which regional co-
operation can be increased at very low cost and with considerable positive spin-offs 
for other, more delicate politics. The fostering of trade instead of aid has succeeded 
and - what is more important - starts to make in-ways into the regional mentality. The 
understanding that phenomena like organised crime or infrastructure development - 
such as energy supply - can only be tackled if regional co-operation is established in 
the first place has been understood. I believe that the very fact that this message has 
been endorsed will be a foundation for many more reform drives in the future, as SEE 
nations begin their accession negotiations with the EU. 
We all know, that SEE countries have a long way to go to make their political 
systems, their economies and their societies fit for EU membership. The Stability Pact 
has considerably and successfully assisted them in some aspects of this development. 
In this respect, the Stability Pact can serve as a model or blueprint to stabilise and 
recover other post-conflict or crisis regions. However, what makes the environment in 
which the Stability Pact is functioning unique, is the magnetic attraction of EU and 
NATO. And for this, I have not come across any convincing alternative or 
replacement if we want to apply the Stability Pact formula to other areas in the world. 
 
Thank you very much 
 
